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NINETY YEARS AND TWO DAYS
IN FORTY-FIVE MINUTES
STEPHEN CALKINS*
The Federal Trade Commission throws unusually good parties. Why
this is true is not obvious-but it is obviously true. Perhaps the ability
to party well is inherent in a collegial body. Democrats and Republicans,
liberals and conservatives, are forced to coexist. Although the agency
has experimented with strife, harmony has proven the superior approach.
And how better to harmonize than through parties?
Every FTC alum has favorite memories of inaugural parties, farewell
parties, and holiday parties. Who can forget the time that-and discretion
prevents the printing of the tale. So enamored of parties are ErC-ers
that they continue going to FTC parties even after graduating from the
agency, so to speak, as proven by the continued existence of the Castro
C. Geer Chapter of the Federal Trade Commission Alumni Association.'
To the list of fabled parties must now be added the Commission's
90th birthday party. The author of this commentary was drafted to attend
the proceedings and then share reflections on the highlights and low-
lights. Those reflections, updated with the revising of papers, are
recorded here. 2
Also included here is one sobering conclusion: the FTC is at risk. Time
and again critics ask whether, were one starting anew, it would make
sense to have two antitrust agencies-with the answer always being "no"
* Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Wayne State University Law
School. The author served as General Counsel of the FTC from 1995-1997, after serving
an early stint as attorney-advisor to Commissioner Stephen Nye.
'For a rare preserved relic of one of these parties, see Thomas Leary, The Spell of
the Gherkin, Remarks Presented at the Castro C. Geer Chapter of the Federal Trade
Commission Alumni Association Annual Business Meeting (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/spellofthegherkin.htm.
2 The Commission also celebrated its 75th anniversary with a symposium. See Federal
Trade Commission 75th Anniversary Symposium, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 797 (1989). Seven partici-
pants in that symposium took turns on stage for the 90th. Sadly, although then-Chairman
Steiger expressed the hope that "we are all here for the 100th," id. at 797, several partici-
pants-including Chairman Steiger-are no longer with us.
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and the inference being that we should think about abolishing one
(always the FTC). Even today, after a singularly successful decade of
accomplishments, the FTC faces the same old questions. How much
more searing will be the scrutiny when things go poorly? Yet the Commis-
sion faces these challenges with its own special strengths-strengths that
have carried it for ninety years and are likely to carry it for many more.
I. MY PERSONAL HIGHLIGHTS
Selecting highlights from an event such as this is a fool's errand. The
conference was one long highlight. That said, the conference organizers
chose someone with tenure to close the conference by reminding
listeners-and, here, readers-of particularly interesting points. There
follows an idiosyncratic list of things that I especially enjoyed. Some are
individuals, some are sessions, some are points raised. (Individuals who
happen to be omitted are begged to remember the context under which
this was done-and that this is merely a list of what struck one observer
at the time as particularly interesting.) As a bonus, an appendix records
many of the program's most memorable lines and some entertaining
insights into program participants.
1. The Two Chairmen Together. It was a special delight to see former
Chairmen Pitofsky and Muris sharing the stage. That doesn't happen
very often. Chairmen and their predecessors rarely appear together, in
part because it is the incumbent Chairman who is really newsworthy and
in part because it could be unseemly for holders of that office to criticize
each other. Indeed, in their joint appearance each distinguished guru
strenuously worked to avoid differing with the other, even with respect
to topics (such as privacy legislation or vertical mergers) where their
respectful differences are well known.
The session demonstrated more than that Muris and Pitofsky are
friends. It is generally agreed that these are two of the more eminently
qualified persons ever to serve as Chairman.3 Both gave much to the
institution. Their exchanging thoughts about the agency and its special
role served uniquely to emphasize their commitment to helping it
succeed.
2. The TC's Resident Historian. Marc Winerman, an outstanding career
FTC attorney, deservedly received substantial credit for the very existence
3 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, supra this issue,
72 ANTITRUST LJ. 761 (2005).
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of the event. His devotion to FTC history, exemplified by his exhaustive
work on the origins of the FTC,4 helped inspire this celebration.
Although one could highlight many of Winerman's historical insights
without committing error, one particularly striking point deserves men-
tion: the early FTC voted to establish a chairmanship so weak that not
only did it lack special powers, but it rotated annually!5 Majority vote
decided promotions, performance ratings, and the forgiving of annual
leave. Is it any wonder that the Commission failed to establish an agenda
that attracted substantial credit and support? Too often we forget that
such administrative process decisions can have profound effects on
performance.
6
3. The Story of the Cigarette Rule. Four different contributions discuss the
Cigarette Rule, 7 and rightly so. That rulemaking proceeding is "correctly
regarded even now as one of the high points in the Commission's
history."8
The story has a better beginning than end. The Surgeon General's
much-anticipated report on smoking and health was issued on Saturday,
January 11, 1964. Chairman Paul Rand Dixon and Commissioners Philip
Elman and Everette Macintyre sat waiting in Chairman Dixon's office.
(All three had been appointed by President Kennedy. The fourth Com-
missioner, Sigurd Anderson-one seat was vacant-was not present. He
left the Commission February 29, 1964.9) A staff member brought in
copies of the press release and the report and the three of them just
4 Marc Winerman, The Origins of theFTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competi-
tion, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003).
5 Mark Winerman, The First 90 Years, Promise and Performance 34-35 (Sept. 22, 2004),
Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/040922transcripto01
.pdf.
6 Also worthy of special note is the close connection between the FTC and the SEC.
How many of us remembered, if we ever knew, that the FTC was the original enforcer
of the Securities Act of 1933 and gave the SEC some of its earliest commissioners (with
the advantage to the SEC being to the disadvantage of the FTC). See Mark Winerman,
The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 871,
880 (2005).
7 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Liability of Cigarettes in Relation to Public Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (July 2, 1964). See William MacLeod et al., Three
Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition Policy, supra this
issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943 (2005); Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and
Consumer Protection: Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, surpa this issue, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 911 (2005); Posner, supra note 3; Teresa Moran Schwartz & Alice Saker
Hrdy, FTC Rulemaking: Three Bold Initiatives and Their Legal Impact, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/docs/040922schwartzhrdy.pdf.
8 Posner, supra note 3, at 769.
9 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 9562 (Commissioner terms).
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started reading. When they finished, Chairman Dixon, a "pretty heavy
smoker... put down his cigarette and said, 'That's my last cigarette." 10
Elman offered to "'see if I can draft something over the weekend,"'
and proceeded, with the help of his "genius assistant, Dick Posner," to
draft a notice of proposed rulemaking.1 Seven days later (also on a
Saturday, so as not to roil the markets) the Commission issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking. The Commission then held hearings, "not
before some staff officer or hearing examiner," but before the Commis-
sioners themselves. 2 The following July the Commission promulgated
its final rule to require all cigarette packaging and advertising to disclose
"prominently" that smoking "may cause death from cancer."13
What a great story! The Commissioners gather on a Saturday collec-
tively to read a report; within a week they propose rulemaking that
frontally takes on one of the most powerful industries in America; they
personally hold hearings and gather evidence; and they issue a final rule
in less than six months. They did all this, moreover, in the face of
considerable pressure from the White House and other political forces
urging delay. As Elman has written, "This was Dixon's finest hour." 14
"With all the complaints I've had about Rand Dixon and all of his
disqualifications for the job, his politicking, his everything else, Dixon
did not waver on cigarettes. He saw this as something the Federal Trade
Commission had to do."' 5
4. Recognition of Philip Elman. It is frightening what kids do not know.
For the college class of 2008, Orson Welles, Roy Orbison, and Cary Grant
have always been dead-and aspirin has always been used to keep people
10 NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN, AN
ORAL HISTORY MEMOIR 342 (2004).
" See id. ("Dick Posner is probably a genius in his ability to turn out work that's first
rate, and quickly. He has a great capacity to absorb masses of facts and arrange them
in his brain, and out it comes. And his first drafts are like other people's last drafts,
only better.").
12 Id. at 343-44.
13 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Liability of Cigarettes in Relation to the Public
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8375 (July 2, 1964); see, e.g., MacLeod et
al., supra note 7, at 947. Elman, who claims to have written the FTC's warning, explained,
"Notice that that warning has the two trigger words, death and cancer. It's all I cared about.
I wanted those two words in every cigarette ad." LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN, supra note 10, at 343.
14 LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN, supra note 10, at 345.
15 Id. at 345-46. Elman concluded his memoir's discussion of the Cigarette Rule: "I
think that of all the things that I did at the commission, the FTC cigarette rule is one of
the things I'm proudest of-even though in the end it got nowhere." Id. at 349.
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from dying of heart attacks. 16 The question is not what youth have forgot-
ten but what (and about whom) they never learned.
Thus, it was gratifying to see Philip Elman, one of the most distin-
guished of all commissioners, receive such deserved attention. 17 Chair-
men dominate the modern Commission, yet relatively few Chairmen
leaving a lasting mark. How much more impressive is it that a non-
Chairman Commissioner could be recognized as playing a critical role!
5. Lessons from People Who Were Present at the Creation. 18 The conference's
greatest thrill, for me, was listening to people who had actually partici-
pated in Commission history. Anyone can analyze and describe, but only
persons who were fortunate enough to be there can share recollections
of what transpired.
Edward Cox was foremost among these.1 9 What a great image! Ed Cox
working to finish the Nader Report,20 driving around Washington in a
car with a stick shift he could not work, running red lights, while Nader
himself rode shotgun without a seatbelt! And then working feverishly to
finish the project, sleeping four hours a night at his brother's place-
and, in the end, helping to launch the Nader Empire. As Cox noted,
that Empire helped jump-start the consumer movement that culminated
in Chairman Pertschuk's appointment. (Also intriguing, especially to
those of us old enough to remember Cox's celebrated wedding of Tricia
Nixon, was Cox's recitation of a series of progressive actions taken by
President Nixon.)
Cox shared an insight worth emphasizing. Agencies are born with a
kind of "agency DNA," he said. One can truly understand an agency
only by understanding that DNA-which is yet another reason why pro-
grams such as this one are so important.
Robert Pitofsky similarly shared revealing remembrances of times gone
by. Especially striking, to me, was his recounting of the time that he
(then Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection), the Chairman
16 See Beloit College's Mindset List® for the Class of 2008, available at http://www.beloit.edu/
-pubaff/mindset.
17 See Posner, supra note 3, at 761.
18 Cf DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPART-
MENT (1969).
19 Edward Cox, The First 90 Years: Promise and Performance (Sept. 24, 2004), Transcript,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/history/transcripts/040922transcriptOOI.pdf
20 EDWARD F. Cox ET AL., THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1969).
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and the General Counsel sat down for an evening with three television
sets, just watching the commercials! 21 That evening triggered four
national advertising investigations. How long has it been since the Com-
mission brought multiple network advertising cases? 22 Also revealing was
Pitofsky's cheerful confession that he personally ignored the vertical
merger guidelines.
Two speakers reminisced about critical periods in the development
of modern FTC consumer protection enforcement. Howard Beales told
of the origins of the Commission's important unfairness and deception
statements. 23 David FitzGerald used a matter-of-fact tone to tell the quite
thrilling tale of the development of Section 13(b) from a "curiosit[y]"
into the cornerstone of the Commission's consumer protection pro-
gram. 24 This is a remarkable story and a real tribute to imaginative,
effective, patient lawyering by Commission staffers. FitzGerald drew
important lessons from the saga, including to do your homework and
make sure you are using such weapons as you have. (Even when it had
13(b), the Commission was persuading Congress to grant it explicit
authority to seek consumer redress, in FTC Act Section 19-which has
proven of little use compared to the invaluable 13(b).)
Others who recounted being "present at the creation" are not repre-
sented in this volume. Claudia Higgins reviewed the origins of carve-out
settlements of merger cases.25 Mary Lou Steptoe shared her perspective
on some key cases litigated during her years at the Commission, describ-
21 Robert Pitofsky and Tim Muris, A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky 159,
(Sept. 22, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/history/transcripts/
040922transcriptOO3.pdf; see also More than Law Enforcement: The FTC's Many Tools-A Conver-
sation with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005).
22 Cf REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
43, 54 (1989) [KIRKPATRICK II] (noting the rise of alternative reviewers of advertising
claims and expressing divided views about whether the FTC was bringing sufficient cases,
but urging the Commission to "do more to articulate its advertising law-enforcement
agenda").
23 Howard Beales, Beyond Litigation: Studies, Guidelines and Policy Statements 66 et seq.
(Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/history/transcripts/040923/
transcript008.pdf.
24 David M. Fitzgerald, The Genesis of Consumer Protection Remedies Under Section
13(b) of the FTC Act 18, available at http://www.ftc.gov/history/docs/fitzgerald
remedies.pdf.
25 Claudia Higgins, Injunctions, Divestiture, and Disgorgement 28 (Sept. 23, 2004),
Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/040923transcriptO07
.pdf (tracing the remedy to the 1993-1994 investigation of the merger of American Home
Products and American Cyanamid).
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ing Detroit Auto Dealers26 and the bulletproof vest cases 27 as "choice" cases,
as that concept was described by Professor Robert Lande.2' And David
Scheffman importantly reminded us that Ethyl,29 TiO2,30 and Cereals3' were
economics-based cases: 32 economics has long had a central role at the
Commission, including in sometimes painful episodes.
Another cautionary tale was provided by Bill Baer, who reminded us
that the 1980s buzz saw of Capitol Hill attacks was triggered in part by
advocacy efforts related to life insurance and agricultural cooperatives.
3 3
(Baer recalls how Senator Howard Cannon called Chairman Pertschuk
to testify about the FTC's investigation of whole life insurance, privately
thanked him for helping Senator Cannon's personal finances by alerting
him to the disadvantages of the product-and then publicly blasted the
agency for meddling with a valued industry!) Even if it was engaging in
advocacy rather than regulation, and even if its positions had substantial
merits, the Commission was taking on some politically potent industries.
Baer's reminder was a sobering response to Rob Atkinson's call for the
26 Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming in part and
remanding in part Commission order against automobile dealers that had agreed to be
closed on weekends).
27 Personal Protective Armor Ass'n, Inc., 1993 FTC LEXIS 353 (Jan. 27, 1993) (consent
order resolved challenge to association policies against comparative advertising of soft
body armor and against competing by offering product liability insurance).
28 Robert Lande, Under One Umbrella: Integrating the Competition and Consumer
Protection Missions 281 (Sept. 22, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
history/transcripts/040922transcript005.pdf (in both cases "I think as attorneys at the time
we were intuiting our way into a choice approach"); see also Neil W. Averitt & Robert H.
Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law,
10 Loy. CONS. L. REP. 44 (1998); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty:
A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
SE.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). See George A.
Hay, Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 182 (John E.
KwokaJr. & LawrenceJ. White eds., 3d ed. 1999); Michael G. Vita, Fifteen Years After Ethyl:
The Past and Future of Facilitating Practices, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 991 (2001).
30 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (dismissing complaint alleging
that unduly aggressive capacity expansion, limit pricing, and refusal to license technology
illegally sacrificed short-term profits in an attempt to monopolize). See F.M. Scherer,
Antitrust, Efficiency and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 998, 1015 (1987) (applauding the rejection
of what would have been an "incentive-impairing precedent[]").
31 Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982) (complaint dismissed without opinion).
22 David Scheffman, Economics Comes of Age at the FTC 112, 114 (Sept. 23, 2004),
Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcipts/040923transcriptO09
.pdf ("Those were very carefully thought out economics-based cases. And all of them
failed.... Interestingly, the Ti 2 case was really based on what was the new 10 at that time.").
33 William Baer, Beyond Litigation: Studies, Guidelines and Policy Statements 90 et
seq. (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/
040923transcriptOO8.pdf.
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Commission to take on the funeral industry and automobile dealers.34
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz sensibly responded by observing that the
lesson is that you need to pick your battles.
35
6. Categorizations. A surprising number of speakers offered categoriza-
tions that could prove helpful to our understanding of important issues.
In a way, of course, this is what good analysts do. Examples that caught
my attention include the following:
e Susan Creighton's suggestion that "cheap exclusion" cases are espe-
cially likely to be worth bringing.3 6
* John Delacourt's suggestion that state action cases can be located
along a continuum from those emphasizing public interest theory
(Parker v. Brown) to those emphasizing public choice theory (Freedom
Holdings v. Spitzer) .37
" Jonathan B. Baker, Luke Froeb, and David T. Scheffman's energetic
and insightful dispute over the costs and benefits of academic vs.
consulting economics.
38
" Pauline M. Ippolito's very useful contrasting of the goals and culture
of the FDA and the FTC.3 9
.' Robert Atkinson, Beyond Litigation: Studies, Guidelines, and Policy Statements 58 et
seq. (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/
040923transcript008.pdf; see Testimony of Robert Atkinson Before the Federal Trade
Commission Workshop on Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the
Internet (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/
panel/atkinson.pdf; ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE REVENGE OF THE DISINTERMEDIATED: How
THE MIDDLEMAN IS FIGHTING E-COMMERCE AND HURTING CONSUMERS (Progress Policy
Institute Policy Paper Jan. 2001), available at http://www.ppionline.org/documents/
disintermediated.pdf.
31 Cf Jon Leibowitz, Beyond Litigation: Studies, Guidelines and Policy Statements 97
(Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/
040923transcript008.pdf (attributing remark to David Balto).
36 Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata,
Cheap Exclusion, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005).
37 John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the
Proper Role of Government, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 1075 (2005).
38 Jonathan Baker, Economics Comes of Age at the FTC 139 et seq. (Sept. 23, 2004),
Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/O40923transcriptOO9.-
pdf. Compare id. at 141 (Baker: "I think it's clear that [consulting] economics actually
channels scholarly research in industrial organization away from the sort of basic R&D
and towards application."), with 143 (Froeb: "I think that the real benefit of consulting
is that it gives you the questions, and so instead of starting with an answer, you start with
a question, and I think that's so rare in academia .. ").
39 Pauline Ippolito, The FTC and Other Government Agencies: Conflict and Cooperation
181 (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/
040923transcriptOlO.pdf.
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9 Robert Pitofsky's explanation that access was a theme of his time at
the Commission. 40 A series of cases-he mentioned Time Warner,41
Toys "R" Us,42 and ChyslW3-can be best understood as the Commis-
sion's working to preserve access to markets. This is an alternative
vision of the role of antitrust and provides a revealing lens through
which to view the work of the Commission.
7. Further Proof that Where You Stand May Depend on Where You Sit. All
of us are captives of our background and position, and that truism was
proved yet again at this workshop. Examples include the debates about
whether the FTC or the Antitrust Division was better at solving the
remedy puzzle. (Dan Ducore did some seat-sharing by concluding that
the two agencies are converging. 44 )
Especially intriguing in this regard wasJodie Bernstein's good-natured
attack on Lee Peeler's alleged biasing of the session on FFC consumer
rulemaking. That session examined three rules: Cigarettes, Kid Vid, and
Do Not Call. 45 Bernstein, who had worked at the Commission in the
1970s, protested that the FFC had adopted a long series of beneficial
consumer protection rules-and, in particular, that in the 1970s the
Commission adopted several trade regulation rules of lasting importance.
She saluted especially the holder in due course rule, 46 which she
described as a bold attempt-made in the face of fierce opposition-to
help consumers without entering the swamp of litigation. (White and
40 Pitofsky & Muris Transcript, supra note 21, at 175 ("I guess if I were to select a broad
theme, it is the emphasis on access.").
41 Time Warner, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3709 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1997) (consent order
to address post-merger incentives for cable television system to disfavor rival programming).
42 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (enforcing FTC order against
toy maker boycott of warehouse clubs).
43 Fair Allocation Sys., Inc., 1998 FTC LEXIS 81 (consent order entered Aug. 5, 1998)(ending auto dealers' pressuring Chrysler to limit allocation of popular models to rivaldealer selling discounted vehicles over the Internet).
44 Dan Ducore, Injunctions, Divestiture and Disgorgement 53-54 (Sept. 23, 2004), Tran-
script, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/O409232transcriptOO7.pdf
("I think there's more of a convergence going on than people might get out of the
discussion this morning ... ").
45Jodie Bernstein, Kids, Calls and Cigarettes: Successful-and Not So Successful-Con-
sumer Protection Initiatives 124 (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/history/transcripts/040922transcriptOO2.pdf ("Why these three rules? ...
"[A] re we supposed to come to the conclusion by this biased-I would say biased selection-
that my Commission, the Lean, Mean Pitofsky-led Bureau was totally misguided in the
'70s, leading up to this debacle with the Kid's Rule, right?"). For the papers discussing
these rules, see MacLeod et al., supra note 7; Milkis, supra note 7; Schwartz & Hrdy, supra
note 7.
4FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 433 (2005);
see Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Promulgation of Trade RegulationRule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,511 (1975).
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Summers, expressing grudging admiration for "the cleverness of the
rascals at the FTC" who addressed the holder in due course doctrine,
observed that "[g] enerations of lawyers and law teachers are surely turn-
ing in their graves at the thought that a mere federal regulation could
bring down this long established doctrine. '47 ) Bernstein also highlighted
the Octane Rule 48 and the Care Labeling Rule,
49 which people applaud
to this day.
Similarly, Cas Hobbs, who also had served at the Commission in the
1970s, argued that many of the old Commission trade regulation rules
made a lot of sense and did a lot of good.
50 He also said that the
endorsements and testimonials guides51 and the Green Guides
5 2 had
made real contributions.
Differing perspectives also were in evidence with respect to the GM/
Toyota joint venture.53 Kathy Fenton, who had been an attorney-advisor
to Chairman Miller at the time, viewed it as "one of the Commission's
47 JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 534-35 (5th ed.
2000). Although they believe that procedurally the Commission "has, at the least, far
exceeded its appropriate reach," they nonetheless generally applaud the consequences of
that overreaching. Id.
41 FTC Automotive Fuel Ratings, Certification and Posting Rule, 6 C.F.R. Part 306 (2005);
see Final Rule Governing Certification and Posting of Octane Numbers Under Title II of
PMPA, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,160 (Mar. 30, 1979).
19 FTC Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel and Certain Piece Goods as Amended,
16 C.F.R. Part 423 (2005); see 36 Fed. Reg. 23,883 (1971).
50 Caswell 0. Hobbs, Under One Umbrella: Integrating the Competition and Consumer
Protection Missions 246 et seq. (Sept. 22,2004), Transcript, available athttp://www.ftc.gov/
ftc/history/transcripts/040922transcriptOO5.pdf; see also Caswell 0. Hobbs, Antitrust and
Consumer Protection-Exploring the Common Ground, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1153
(2005). Hobbs mentioned, among others, the Care Labeling Rule already highlighted,
but also the Funeral Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 453 (2005); see 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260
(Sept. 24, 1982); Used Motor Vehicle Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 455 (2005); see 49 Fed. Reg.
45,725 (Nov. 19, 1984); Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part
460 (2005); see 44 Fed. Reg. 50,242 (Aug. 27, 1979); the Franchising Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part
436 (2005); see 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (Dec. 21, 1978); Vocational Schools Rule, see FTC
Trade Regulation Rule on Proprietary Vocational and Home Study Schools, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,796 (Dec, 28, 1978), remanded, Katharine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658 (2d
Cir. 1979), rulemaking terminated, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,482 (Aug. 5, 1988) (The Commission's
Guides for Private Vocational and Distance Education, 16 C.F.R. Part 254 (2005); see 37
Fed. Reg. 9665 (May 16, 1972), remain in effect.); Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R.
Part 429 (2005); see 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934 (Oct. 26, 1972); Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R.
Part 444 (2005); see 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (Mar. 1, 1984); and Negative Option Rule, 16 C.F.R.
Part 425 (2005); see 38 Fed. Reg. 4896 (Feb. 22, 1973).
51 FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16
C.F.R. Part 255 (2005); see 40 Fed. Reg. 22,128 (May 21, 1975).
52 FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. Part 260
(2005); see 61 Fed. Reg. 53,316 (Oct. 11, 1996).
53 General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent order).
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most significant decisions" 54 and a "seminal step ... in advancing modemjoint venture analysis." 55 At the same time, she portrayed it as a decision
that properly analyzed was quite easy ("a whole new generation of anti-
trust lawyers and economists looking back ... might well ask 'What was
the big deal?'"56). Jon Baker, commenting as an economist who actually
bought one of the cars produced by the joint venture, gently protested
that in the context of the times the case was not such a no-brainer as
one might now think.5 7 He pointed out that the auto industry was a tight
oligopoly, entry was difficult, imports were restricted, GM and Toyota
were failing to compete vigorously in small cars, and this venture could
have resulted in the exchange of sensitive information. The venture
technically violated Section 7 unless one took-and this was his take-
away from the case-an economics-oriented approach.
John Kwoka, who had worked as an expert for the Commission on
the matter, offered yet a different perspective: the real issue in the case,
for him, was whether the Commission should have insisted that if General
Motors were to enter ajoint venture with ajapanese automaker, it should
be with Isuzu (apparently an available option) rather than Toyota. He
added that hindsight has shown that both the risks and the benefits of
the venture were overstated. 8 (My own perspective is yet again different
and turns on the then-substantial public pressure to limit Japanese
imports. The FTC, which is institutionally committed to open borders,
may have viewed helping Toyota circumvent voluntary export restraints
as a public benefit that sufficiently offset any perceived antitrust risk. 59)
Finally, note two very different perspectives on the Kirkpatrick era at
the FTC. Ed Cox, with the perspective even now of a former "Nader's
Raider," saw it as the coming together of different elements of the
54 Kathryn M. Fenton, GM/Tyota: Twenty Years Later, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
1013 (2005).
5 Id. at 1027.
56 Id. at 1013.
57 Jonathan Baker, Price Discrimination, Professions, Joint Ventures, and ExclusionaryConduct: From Competitors to Protecting Competition 227 et seq. (Sept. 22, 2004),Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/O40922transcriptOO4.-
pdf; see also Jonathan B. Baker, Two Modern Antitrust Moments: A Comment on Fenton and
Kwoka, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1029 (2005).
58 Baker Transcript, supra note 57; see a/soJohn E. Kwoka, Jr, InternationalJoint Venture:
General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 46 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
59 As yet further proof that where you stand may depend upon where you sit, this Detroit-based professor must gently protest Ms. Fenton's referring to General Motors's role in
the 1980s as being "the largest U.S. manufacturer of automobiles." Fenton, supra note 55,
at 1015 (emphasis added). Thanks in part to loyal consumers, General Motors is the world'slargest auto maker. See, e.g., Christine Tierney & Ed Garsten, Toyota, GM Locked in Fight
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consumer revolution. 60 Judge Posner, instead, emphasized the criticisms
of the Kirkpatrick Commission (on which he served but from whose
report he dissented) 61 and President Nixon's political status: "as a Repub-
lican he was predisposed to accept and act on the criticisms of an agency
long dominated by Democrats."
62
II. THE FTC AT RISK
The two days of the conference were suffused with the sense that we
have finally arrived at the best of all possible worlds.
63 Did the FTC once
lack adequate tools? No more. Did it once embark on frivolous frolics? No
more. Was it once the "National Nanny?" No more. Was its organization
bizarre? No more. Were its leaders lacking? No more. The Commission
had accomplished remarkable things and from it more remarkable things
could be expected-or that seemed to be the common belief. It is not
surprising that a birthday party would emphasize the positive, of course,
but spirits were unusually high even for a party.
It is only appropriate, therefore, for this last writer to sound a note
of caution. The FTC has always been an agency at risk. The Antitrust
Division, which enjoys the comforting embrace of the Executive Branch,
is not going anywhere. The FTC is more vulnerable, and remains so to
this day.
Several cautionary notes need mentioning. Even the rose-colored
glasses of the conference reveal some issues deserving of attention. There
is much more for the agency to do. At the same time, the agency is
threatened by its own success, both because too much may be asked of
it and because overconfidence is a risk. Finally, it is worrisome that the
FTC is under attack even today, when things are going so well.
1. Reasons for Concern. At the most basic level, the harmony of the
program did not conceal the differences that (not surprisingly) continue
to exist. Robert Pitofsky implied that almost everyone favors a "notice
and consent" approach to privacy,64 but in fact many people do not.
Robert Lande advocated the "consumer choice" approach to antitrust
for Worldwide Supremacy, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 13, 2005, at IA (GM sold 8,241,000
vehicles worldwide in its most recent fiscal year, Toyota 6,719,363).
60 See Cox Transcript, supra note 19.
61 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
62 Posner, supra note 3, at 764.
63 See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Penguin Classics trans. 1947).
64 Pitofsky & Muris Transcript, supra note 21, at 163 ("It's also true that most agree,
notice, consent, access, and security are what you're entitled to in terms of privacy.").
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that he has developed with Neil Averitt 65 as an alternative way to analyze
antitrust issues. Cas Hobbs called for increased use of unfairness author-
ity, more guidelines, and more mandatory consumer disclosures. Even
at a party celebrating this "best of all possible worlds," voices called
for change.
The conference did not address but also did not conceal some slightly
troubling personnel issues. Note, for instance, that we heard from the
two deputy directors of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, both out-
standing career Commission lawyers (one of whom is serving as acting
director of the Bureau). The organizers also could have called on any
of several outstanding career FTC lawyers who serve as assistant directors
of the Bureau or as deputy or assistant General Counsels. The picture
is somewhat different for the Bureau of Competition. Here, deputies
tend to serve only for a couple of years, and, although there are notable
exceptions, far fewer assistant directors are long-serving career lawyers. 66
Obviously the market is at work, and the financial rewards of private
practice are luring away talented Commission employees. Perhaps equally
talented employees are being attracted to the Bureau of Competition,
and perhaps BC functions as well with high turnover as BCP does with
low-but perhaps not.67
Another personnel issue, this one somewhat delicate, concerns Admin-
istrative Law Judges (ALJs). The FTC is supposed to be an expert body
with a comparative advantage over the federal courts in adjudicating
complicated competition and consumer protection cases. Yet the Com-
mission has no authority to require that new ALJs be experts in any
subject relevant to the Commission's docket. Nor, for understandable
reasons, is the Commission free to replace ALJs whose performance is
sub-optimal. The result is that although the Commission has had some
first-rate ALJs, there will inevitably be a risk that litigation at the FTC
'5 See supra note 28.
6 Cf Press Release, FITC, FTC Chairman Announces Staff Changes in Bureau of Competi-
tion (Deputy DirectorJeffrey Schmidt appointed from private practice); In Brief 87 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 524 (Nov. 19, 2004) (Deputy Director D. Bruce Hoffman
to return to private practice after two years at the Commission, includingjust over a year
as deputy); People, FTC: WATCH No. 601 (Jan. 6, 2003) (Assistant Director Michael H.Knight (Mergers III) appointed from private practice). Compare Press Release, FTC, FTCAnnounces Reorganization of its Competition Bureau (Oct. 1, 1998) (three new assistantdirectors named, one from outside the FTC and one with two years' government experi-
ence), with FTC Bureau of Competition Organization Chart (Aug. 2004), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/bcorgchart.pdf (all three officials no longer serving).
67 Dollars also increasingly lure economists. Cf People, FTC: WATCH No. 634 (June 21,
2004) (former deputy director of the Bureau of Economics, a 14-year FTC veteran,joined
economic consulting firm). So many distinguished academic economists spend substantial
time consulting that it is sometimes hard to identify experts who are both expert and
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will be perceived not as distinctly superior to that in federal court but
perhaps even as inferior. The Antitrust Modernization Commission
(AMC) gave serious thought to studying what a Commission working
group saw as this "good government" issue,6s although in the end it
elected not to pursue this FTC-focused issue. That failure to pursue the
issue does not make it any less an issue.
Ironically, one of the great stories of the conference-that of the
Commission's promulgation of the Cigarette Rule-illustrates a problem
with the current functioning of personnel: Commissioner interaction.
Recall that three Commissioners met on a Saturday, read the just-issued
Surgeon General's Report, and agreed to try to write a rule. That could
never happen today. Under the Sunshine Act,69 three Commissioners
may not have a "meeting" without publishing advance notice and inviting
the public. Exemptions permit some meetings to be announced in
advance but kept closed, but it is doubtful that any exemption would
have protected this meeting (and, even if it had, notice of the meeting
would have been required) .70 Commission staff can meet freely, as can
Commissioner attorney advisors, but Commissioners themselves are con-
strained. This is a problem that impairs interaction among Commis-
sioners on a whole series of issues, including even the writing of
formal opinions.
Personnel issues aside, there is much more that the Commission could
do. Antitrust ambiguities remain unresolved, but the list of BCP projects
still needing work is particularly long. SPAM and identity theft continue
unabated. Beyond that, recall all those statutes and trade regulation
rules that Cas Hobbs saluted: no one would say that they are all ideal.
For the past decade the Commission has been trying to amend the
unconflicted. Query, too, whether research is being affected-not biased in how it is done,
but perhaps influenced in the questions asked.
68 Memorandum from Civil Procedure and Remedies Working Group to All Commission-
ers Re: Civil Procedure and Remedies Issues Recommended for Commission Study 11-12
(Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/CivilProcedure.pdf; see
also Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association to the Anti-
trust Modernization Commission 9 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/comments/2004/CommentsModemizationCommission.pdf (suggesting Com-
mission attention to this issue) (the author was a member of the task force that helped
prepare the Section's report).
- 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
70 See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Special Commit-
tee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sept. 12, 1995), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/suntest.htm.; ABA Antitrust Section Report, supra note 68,
at 9-10 (suggesting Commission attention to this issue).
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Franchising Rule.7' For a long time it was very hard for consumers to
access appliance efficiency data on the Web. 72 More seriously, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act 73 is almost unintelligible even to sophisticated
users. 7 How has the Commission responded to this confusion? By refus-
ing as a general matter to issue written interpretations of the Act 75 and
by failing regularly to update its Official Staff Commentary, which is
little changed from its issuance in 1990.76 This is too important an act
to abandon to confusion. Similarly, Truth in Lending 77 is a laudable
principle and a nightmare reality, in which consumers are given moun-
tains of useless information when they close on a mortgage-when it is
too late, given human nature, to affect their credit-buying decision.78
For that matter, even national advertising issues need attention. The
Commission's Endorsement Guides are badly in need of revision. 79 This
consumer finds comparison shopping for telecommunications service
very challenging (which fees really are imposed by the government, and
which might differ between service providers?); query whether jurisdic-
71 16 C.F.R. Part 436; see Bureau of Consumer Protection Staff Report to the Federal
Trade Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (Aug. 2004), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O4/O8/O408franchiserulerpt.pdf
72 Cf http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/Conline/edcams/eande/index.html (appliance data new-
ly available).
73 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
74 SeeANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 6 (National Consumer LawCenter 5th ed. 2002) ("the Act is so poorly drafted and difficult to understand that courts
are in disagreement over some fundamental questions").
75 See http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcrajump.htm ("Except in unusual circumstances,
the staff will no longer issue written interpretations of the FCRA.") (staff opinion letters
end in 2001).76 Statements of General Policy or Interpretations Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
16 C.F.R. Part 600 Appendix. As required by Congress, the Commission has issued a series
of guidance documents, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,776 (Nov. 30, 2004), but although they may helplay persons begin to understand their rights and responsibilities, they do not provide the
clear answers that legal advisors require.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
- See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b) ("The creditor shall make disclosures before consummation
of the transaction.").
7 The Guides, at 16 C.F.R. Part 255, were last updated in 1980. The Ninth Circuit,
ruling against the Commission in FTC v. Garvey, 383 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2004), viewed theGuides as not controlling the behavior of endorsers, and said that additional guidancefrom the Commission or Congress would be helpful. Id. at 904 n.14. Particularly troubling
to me is Guide 2, which authorizes the showing of a consumer making a completely
unsubstantiated, atypical performance claim, so long as this is that abnormal individual'sgenuine belief and so long as the advertisement "clearly and conspicuously disclose[s]
the limited applicability or the endorser's experience to what consumers may generally
expect to achieve." 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(a). We have all seen far too many weight-loss ads
with apparently typical consumers boasting of great results, with a disclaimer at the end
saying something we are incapable of understanding.
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tional hurdles completely prevent the Commission from doing anything
to improve the situation (and query whether the hurdles could be
removed).
The real worry, however, is not that the Commission will do too little,
but that it will try to do too much. Congress has learned that the Commis-
sion can accomplish politically popular things and that referring matters
to the Commission is an easy way to claim action. The result is that the
Commission is spending increasing time promulgating rules or conduct-
ing studies demanded by Congress.80 The agency is capable of only a
certain amount of quality work. More generally, the Commission is at
risk of being asked to solve societal problems that defy easy solutions.
Obesity, and particularly childhood obesity, is only one current exam-
ple.8 l The Commission also is at risk of being called on to joust with the
politically powerful, as evidenced by the substantively meritorious call
during this program for the Commission to work to facilitate direct-to-
consumer Internet sales of, among other things, automobiles.
8 2
The problem is not only that the Commission may be asked to do too
much, but that it may try to do too much. Whenever things are going
well there is a risk of over-confidence. Time and again a speaker at this
conference observed that the Commission has never enjoyed the respect
and popular support that it does now. Inevitably, there is a risk of being
insufficiently critical. Thus, Professor Muris boasted that the Commis-
80 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Study on Competition in Contact Lens Market
(Feb. 15, 2005) (64-page report required by Congress), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2005/O2/contactlens.htm; Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Report to Congress on
Results of Studies Required by FACTA (Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2004/12/factarpt.htm; Press Release, FTC, FTC Seeks Comments on Proposed Regulation
Improving Prescreen Opt-Out Notices (Sept. 27, 2004) (rulemaking required by FACTA),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/09/prescreen.htm.
s See Pestering Parents: How Food Companies Market Obesity to Children 41 (Center
for Science in the Public Interest Nov. 2003), available at http://cspinet.org/niew/pdf/
pesteringparentsnopictures.pdf ("Congress should give the Federal Trade Commission
the authority and adequate funding to develop and implement ... nutrition standards
for foods that can be advertised and marketed to children and limit advertising and
marketing for foods that do not meet those standards."); see alsoJ. Howard Beales, III,
Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, Competition, Advertising, and Health
Claims: Legal and Practical Limits on Advertising Regulation, Remarks Before the George
Mason Law Review 2004 Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Protection (Mar. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/O
4 0312childads.pdf (reviewing chal-
lenges of childhood obesity and of the FTC's doing anything about it).
Discussing the importance of resisting pressure to take inappropriate action on obesity,
Chairman Muris has noted, "Even our dogs and cats are fat-and that's not because
of advertising."
82 See supra note 34.
NINETY YEARS AND Two DAYS
sion's "unfairness test" is a rigorous cost/benefit test,83 whereas, although
he likely applied it that way, there is nothing about the actual wording
of the test that compels that result.84 Or consider that the Commission
is now secure that it protects "competition, not competitors." It is impor-
tant to remember that similar confidence was shared by the Brown Shoe85
Court and even very early Commissions. 6 This may seem to be the best
of all possible worlds, but, then, some earlier eras now viewed with
disdain may have seemed pretty good, too.
Even during the best of all possible times, the Commission's lasting
impact depends substantially on judicial decisions. Bill Kovacic made a
good case for the Commission's using all of its tools (and for measuring
various outcomes), but inevitably a common law system-which is what
antitrust largely is-depends on court decisions to make lasting
changes. 87 (This is less true for consumer law, in which statutes and
regulations play much larger roles.) Search the antitrust casebooks and
one finds few pages devoted to speeches, consent orders, amicus briefs,
hearings, and, with a notable exception, even guidelines. What one does
find are court opinions18
I still recall when, during Chairman Pitofsky's time at the FTC, we
were working on the Time Warner/Ted Turner merger,89 and someone
observed that this merger was so important that it would define the
Pitofsky era. Not even close, of course. It is the Staples court decision 90
83 Pitofsky & Muris Transcript, supra note 21, at 168.
81 See Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935 (2000) (sympo-
sium issue).
81 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 & 344 (1962).
86 Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), 1969 FTC LEXIS 27, 163 n.21 (Jones,
Comm'r) ("The Robinson-Patman Act protects competition, not competitors.").
17 The court decisions that shape antitrust doctrine may be agency cases, but they may
also be private cases in which an agency has made an important contribution as an amicus.
See Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2001) (symposium
issue). And competitiveness can be shaped importantly through other competition advo-
cacy efforts outside antitrust doctrine, such as might occur through the Commission's
recent work in health care and intellectual property.
88 See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY xxxi-xxxvii (2002) (deliberately modern case-
book includes among its "principal cases" three consent orders, a complaint, an announce-
ment of the closing of an investigation, a business review letter-and 92 reported opinions).
89 Time Warner, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3709 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1997) (consent order).
9o FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
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that is in the casebooks91 and is cited by Judge Posner,9 2 among others,
as a signal contribution of that administration. 9 Similarly, the Muris era
is likely to make its lasting antitrust mark through Arch Coal94 and the
appellate decisions in Three Tenors,95 Schering-Plough,96 and, perhaps, Union
Oil.97 (In this connection, the brave talk about the government continu-
ing to rely on consumer testimony to litigate merger cases is a little
disconcerting.)
Perhaps the best evidence that the FTC is at risk is that it is under
attack even today, when it is at a high-water mark in terms of respect
and support. The AMC is once again studying whether "merger enforce-
ment at the federal level [should] continue to be administered by two
separate agencies." 98 Although phrased neutrally, there is no constitu-
ency for abolishing the Antitrust Division,99 so any such question actually
asks whether to eliminate the Commission's role. The Modernization
Commission is also studying whether, if dual enforcement is to continue,
"should steps be taken to eliminate differences in treatment arising out
of which agency reviews a merger." 100 The Modernization Commission
clearly contemplates that any changes to reduce differences would
change the FTC-not Antitrust Division-procedures and legal stan-
dards. 101 The more precisely that the FTC duplicates the Antitrust Divi-
91 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 718 (6th ed. 2004); CAVIL ET
AL., supra note 88, at 522; E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 855 (5th ed. 2003). Unfortunately, the Areeda casebook
also includes the Commission's sui generis defeat in FrC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946
F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affldpercuriam, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). SeeAREEDA
ET AL., supra, at 743.
9 2 Posner, supra note 3, at 765 (the Commission's "imaginative use of statistics" was a
"genuine accomplishment"); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 157-58 (2d
ed. 2001).
91 Some casebooks also include Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000),
see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 88, at 798; ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID &
DIANE P. WOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 505 (5th ed. 2003).
94 FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
91 PolyGram Holdings, Inc., IFTC Docket No. 9298 (final order July 24, 2003).
96 Schering-Plough Corp., FTC Docket No. 9297 (final order Dec. 8, 2003). After these
remarks were delivered, the FTC lost on appeal. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d
1056 (l1th Cir. 2005). A petition for rehearing is pending.
97 Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Docket No. 9305 (July 7, 2004) (vacating initial decision
and remanding for further proceedings).
98 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Issues Selected for Study (Jan. 13, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/study-issues.pdf.
91 See Posner, supra note 3, at 765 ("we're not about to abolish or reduce the authority
of... the Justice Department").
10 See AMC, Issues for Study, supra note 98.
101 That the AMC is contemplating recommending changes in how the FTC does business
is clear from its background memorandum, which notes that some commentators believe
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sion, however, the stronger is the argument for ending the FTC's
antitrust authority.
Even the praise Judge Posner shared during the conference dinner is
reason for concern. Why should an administrative agency, as well as the
Justice Department, enforce antitrust laws-a question that "continue [s]
to be worth asking," he said. 0 2 He postulated three reasons: because of
its possibly broader substantive mandate, because of its "capacities denied
to the ordinary courts," and because of the possible "benefits to com-
petition among law enforcers." 10 He rejected all three, and somewhat
reluctantly concluded that the Commission should be retained, even
though not justified in terms of governmental structure, only because
"it works." 104
The problem for the Commission is that an argument for retaining
the FTC only because it is performing well may vanish when, as inevitably
will happen, the Commission starts performing less well. If the Commis-
sion is at a pinnacle of respect, there is only one way to go. If there
are serious calls for fundamentally changing, if not eliminating, the
Commission's merger enforcement authority at a time when that author-
ity is viewed as being exercised responsibly (and, one might add, when
the Antitrust Division is suffering through a string of judicial setbacks),
think how strong those calls will be when the Commission is performing
less well. The best evidence that the Commission will always be at some
risk is that its role is being questioned precisely during these best of all
possible times.
that "three features of FTC procedure may place companies having their transaction
reviewed by the FTC, rather than by DOJ, at a relative disadvantage." See Memorandum from[AMC] Mergers, Acquisitions, andJoint Ventures Working Group to All Commissioners Re:
Mergers Issues Recommended for Commission Study 6 (Dec. 21, 2004). Conspicuously
absent is any discussion of complaints that features of the DOJ procedure place firms it
reviews at a relative advantage. Similarly, the Memorandum observes that "[f]airness and
reason would appear to counsel for similar treatment regardless of which agency reviews
a merger," which (a) "may be a factor favoring the elimination of dual authority," and(b) presents the question "whether the standards applicable to the FTC should-or can-
be modified with respect to mergers, to make them more consistent with standards and
procedures applicable to DOJ." Id. at 6-7.
In this connection-and while expressly noting confidence that AMC Commissioners
will act in good faith-it is nonetheless noteworthy that the Commission includes one
current Antitrust Division official and four former Division officials (two former Assistant
Attorneys General), whereas it includes only one former FTC official (a corporate attorney
who also served four years in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel). About
the Commission, http://www.amc.gov/bios.htm.
102 Posner, supra note 3, at 765.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 770.
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2. Reasons for Optimism. Although the Commission is, and will always
be, at risk, there is reason for optimism. In part, one can cynically
recognize that two Congressional subcommittees enjoy jurisdiction over
the Commission and would be loathe to give it up-and, more generally,
the Commission is the antitrust agency traditionally more responsive to
Congress and Congress is unlikely abolish such an entity. But there are
more legitimate reasons to be optimistic.
First, this conference, and others like it, give reason to be upbeat. An
agency that is willing to ask some hard questions, to listen to its critics
as well as its fans, and to learn from its mistakes is automatically one
step ahead on the road to survival, and even success. The Commission
even invites criticism, as evidenced by BCP's telephoning various Commis-
sion observers and asking what it is doing right-and wrong.
05
Second, the Commission has enjoyed some truly outstanding leader-
ship. As Judge Posner reminded us, in 1997 Bill Kovacic wrote that "only
a handful" of appointees since the late 1960s "have been experts of
truly exceptional accomplishment and stature, and only a minority have
brought significant antitrust or consumer protection experience to the
FTC." 106 Yet Posner noted correctly that both Robert Pitofsky and Timo-
thy Muris, who led the agency from 1995 through 2004, came to the
position as "leading experts in the Commission's fields." 107 Muris accom-
plished the neat trick of both singing Pitofsky's praises and simultane-
ously challenging the agency to do better. Moreover, several recent non-
Chairman Commissioners have been persons of "recognized stature," as
recommended by the ABA Antitrust Section and other observers.10 8 New
Chairman Majoras brought both expertise and an open mind to the
position, and by all accounts used her time as a recess appointment to
good advantage by asking challenging questions. And the longer the
Commission enjoys first-rate leadership, the easier it is to recruit (and
persuade the President to appoint) outstanding Commissioners.
105 I was a recipient of one of those telephone calls.
10 Posner, supra note 3, at 768 (quoting William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments
and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. Rrv. 915, 950 (1997)).
107 Posner, supra note 3, at 768.
108 See KIRKPATRICK II, supra note 22, at 60 ("Above all, the commissioners should be
persons of recognized stature who will be respected by Congress, the businesses the
Commission regulates, and the consumers it protects. With recognized leaders at its helm,
the Commission will benefit from improved relations with Congress, increased deference
from the courts, and acceptance by, if no cooperation from, the business community. In
addition, a Commission composed of individuals of recognized stature will more readily
recruit, retain, and motivate talented staff.").
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Third, the FTC's staff is terrific. It was exciting at this conference to
see more than a dozen career staff taking turns at microphones. That
staff demonstrates a kind of commitment and professionalism that is
the envy of Washington. My favorite story-and it's only one, very typical
example-concerns David Shonka. The Commission was on the verge
of voting out the Joe Camel case but there was one small problem: no
lead attorney had been designated. I volunteered that Dave might be
willing to move from my (General Counsel's) office to BCP and take on
what promised to be an extremely grueling, indeed unpleasant, assign-
ment. I called Dave at home and gave him overnight to consider the
question, trying to reassure him that he was free to say "no." The next
morning he came into my office before 9:00 a.m., and gave me his
answer: "When you work at an agency and you're told that the Chairman
needs you, there's really only one answer you can give."
Finally, the FTC really is special. Commission employees, current and
past, demonstrate remarkable affection for the former "Little Old Lady
of Pennsylvania Avenue." Indeed, this party is tribute not just to the FTC
but to the warmth it engenders in those who have come to know it.
My favorite story is really Jay Shaffer's. It's about Willie Shelton, the
bailiff when the Sunshine Act'09 opened up the dusty meeting rooms of
the agency to the eager eyes of an adoring public. Worried that fans
might miss a few bon mots, the Commission installed microphones in
its main meeting room. This being an experiment, the agency took steps
to make sure that someone-Willie Shelton-would be alerted if the
system did not function. Notices were placed in spectators' chairs: They
were supposed to say "Raise your hand if the discussion becomes inaudi-
ble," but thanks presumably to an accident, witnesses were invited to
raise their hands "if the discussion becomes incredible" (emphasis added).
At the celebration of a birthday of a sufficiently high number, one
should refrain from counting candles; likewise, we need not try to count
the number of times hands would have been raised in response to such
a notice. But we can observe that the Commission has done, is doing,
and surely will do incredible things for years to come.
See you at the 100th.
109 5 U.S.C. § 552b (enacted Sept. 13, 1976).
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APPENDIX:
INSIGHTS INTO PEOPLE
AND MEMORABLE LINES
People let their hair down a little at parties-even public birthday
parties. Thus, it should not be surprising that at the FFC's 90th birthday
party we gained a series of insights into personalities. Several that caught
my attention are recorded below, after which I record some party guests'
memorable lines.
Commissioner Leary may have been the most candid, cheerfully pro-
claiming that (a) he thinks most breakfast cereal "is inedible, but that's
just me"; (b) "I don't mind telling you, I will not drive a car with a
foreign nameplate, period"; and (c) "I will not wear dungarees unless
I'm riding a horse because I don't want to look like a superannuated
hippie." 110 More substantively provocative, he noted that the Commission
is highly troubled about weight-loss promotional abuses and is urging
the industry to self-regulate-perhaps impliedly reassuring it that the
Commission might be relatively unconcerned about potential anticom-
petitive consequences of such collective action among competitors."'
Chairman Muris was bracingly candid when recounting, about a previ-
ous stint at the Commission: "One of the things I did was to abolish the
Office of Policy Planning so I could take back the [huge corner] Bureau
Director's office because Bob Reich talked Al Kramer out of it. Space
and furniture have a lot to do with bureaucracy!"
11 2
1 0 Thomas Leary, Under One Umbrella: Integrating the Competition and Consumer
Protection Missions 272, 277 (Sept. 22, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
ftc/history/transcripts/040922transcript005.pdf.
"I See id. at 279-80; see also Thomas B. Leary, Competition Law and Consumer Protection
Law: Two Wings of the Same House, supra this issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1147 (2005).
112 Pitofsky & Muris Transcript, supra note 21, at 157-58. Youngsters may not remember
that the irrepressible Robert Reich, short of stature but long on energy and imagination,
served a brief stint at the FTC. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, The Future of Unfair Methods of
Competition, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 801 (1982).
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NINETY YEARS AND Two DAYS
Professor Kenneth Elzinga, who was cited as frequently as anyone
during these sessions, exuded boyish enthusiasm about learning new
facts about old cases." 3 He set an example for all of us.
With so many great speakers, great lines were inevitable. Here is my
list of wordings that stuck with me:
Marc Winerman, quoting President Taft, "'I love judges and I love
courts. They are my ideals on earth that typify what we shall meet after-
ward in Heaven under a just God."' 114
Ed Cox approvingly quoted Jefferson as reportedly saying, "We need
a little revolution every thirty years."" 5
Mary GardinerJones, from the audience: "I'm sorry to intervene but
I'm 86."'' 6
Commissioner Orson Swindle, commenting on the theme from the
television show "Law and Order" that was played to introduce a consumer
protection panel: "I first thought it was 'I Heard It Through the Grape-
vine, ' 117 which I assumed was going to be an introduction of how I got
my background in law and antitrust and consumer protection." 118
General Counsel William Kovacic, on the importance of measuring a
variety of FTC outputs: "Imagine the National Basketball Association if
it doesn't measure and track assists!"' 119 (That is a very important point:
an agency will not consistently perform functions for which it is not
rewarded.)
113 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Price Discrimination, Professions, Joint Ventures, and Exclu-
sionary Conduct: From Protecting Competitors to Protecting Competition 221 (Sept. 22,
2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/040922tran-
script004.pdf ("Now, those of us who have studied or taught the Morton case thought we
knew the economic shortcomings of the case. But John [Peterman]'s paper reveals at
least for me two new twists on the Morton Salt plot.").
114 Winerman, supra note 4, at n.176 (quoting Taft Again Defends the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1911, at 6).
15 Cox Transcript, supra note 19, at 83.
116 Quotation is from the author's notes.
117 By Barrett Strong and Norman Whitfield, recorded in 1967 by Gladys Knight and
then, memorably, in 1968 by Marvin Gaye. See ROLLING STONE, The 500 Greatest Songs of
All Time, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/-/id/6595925/sort/rank?
pageid=rs.RS500&pageregion=blob&md=110755455471 6 &has-player=true&version=6.0.
12.1040.
118 Orson Swindle, Kids, Calls, and Cigarettes: Successful-and Not So Successful-
Consumer Protection Initiatives 114 (Sept. 22, 2004), Transcript, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/040922transcriptOO2.pdf.
n9 William Kovacic, The First 90 Years: Promise and Performance 85 (Sept. 22, 2004),
Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcripts/040922transcriptOo1
.pdf.
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Robert Atkinson, on the problem of regulatory capture: "Consumers
can buy a computer from Dell, but can't buy a Ford from Ford .... You
can't even buy a car from the manufacturer in Michigan."
120
Thomas Krattenmaker, also on the problem of regulation: "Today...
we all believe in public choice theory. Jefferson lost, Hamilton won." 
121
Alan Fels, on the typical U.S. reaction to foreign countries considering
moving toward U.S. standards: "If they do, we'll call it convergence, and
if they don't, we'll call it wrong headedness." 1
22
And, best of all, Richard Posner, the dinner speaker who had famously
dissented from the 1969 Kirkpatrick Report and called for the slow wither-
ing away of the Commission-and who was now wryly speculating on
why he should have been the person invited to address a 90th birthday
dinner: "I'm happy to stand before you contrite." 12
3
120 Atkinson Transcript, supra note 34, at 60.
121 Thomas Krattenmaker, The FTC and Other Government Agencies: Conflict and
Cooperation 175 (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/
transcripts/040923transcriptOlO.pdf.
122 Alan Fels, Competition and Consumer Protection in the World Economy: Conflict,
Cooperation and Convergence 236 (Sept. 23, 2004), Transcript, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/transcfipts/040923transcriptOl1.pdf (adding, "I think this is a
narrow-minded sort of perspective").
123 Cf Posner, supra note 3, at 765 ("I am duly chastened, which is no doubt why I was
invited to give this talk.").
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